

- 1- New EO should be all inclusive covering all aspects of declassification to include interaction with FOIA and Privacy Act. It should not include clearance standards/criteria nor storage/safeguard criteria unless people who know something about these aspects are involved in the task force.
- 2- SCI should be singled out/excluded from new EO.
- 3- Sensitive national security information should be included as a separate specific breakout and addressed as such.
- 4- Waivers/exceptions should be allowed per DCI edict in areas of sensitive national security information where very sensitive sources and methods are involved.
- 5- Classified intelligence information involving sensitive agreements in the national interest with foreign governments should be excluded from automatic declassification under the EO.
- 6- EO should include funding authorizations including additional personnel resources to implement and operate.
- 7- I believe that there is need to redefine classification categories, e.g., there is little practical difference between TS and SECRET and much difference between Confidential and SECRET. There should also be some provision for security of "proprietary" information which eg would safeguard inhouse CIA procedures and processes and still allow a reasonable amount of "openness" that Jimmy Carter seems to want.
- 8- We must get the legal eagles to define "reasonableness doctrine" --- "what is reasonable to some is not at all reasonable to me"
- 9- Definitely any classification merely to cover inefficiency or error is repugnant and should carry penalty in new EO.
- 10- The new EO should not require mandatory paragraph markings. This is only a crutch devised by declassification people and is dangerous because information can be withdrawn from classified documents and damage done when this info. is used out of context. This needs a new evaluation.
- 11- Automatic downgrading concepts are very questionable in my mind, and should be left out.

- 12- The new EO should require all who have access to classified have a current security clearance at that level.
- 13- The new EO should provide for need to know evaluation.
- 14- Under no circumstances should the new EO provide for access to classified information for research purposes except there is need to know and the appropriate security clearance is present. Signed secrecy agreement should be required.
- 15- The new EO should redirect the 3rd Agency rule, that security is a function of command in classification and declassification areas, particularly where need to know to sensitive intelligence info (Both SCI and collateral) is concerned.)
- 16- There should be a separate appeal Board established to consider actions involving sensitive intelligence information.
- 17- I do not believe that the new EO on classification should be extended to include standards and criteria for determining trustworthiness. That subject is a separate and complex one, and should be a separate EO ~~fe~~: EO10450 . To include in new EO would be most difficult and nearly impossible if the Sept 1977 completion date is to be met. Additionally, there is chance that this portion of the new EO could be disabled every time a change was felt in order in the main EO----. Revision, etc., could detract from the ability to maintain a long term set of standards and criteria.
- 18- Same as above, I do not think it realistic to include standards and criteria for safeguarding/storage, etc., classified material in new EO.

New EO should:

Clarify any overlaps with FOIA and PA. The EO should stipulate that requests from the public be treated as FOIA or Privacy Act, as appropriate.

Info which is intrinsically classified, e.g., contains exact data re: sources and methods or other data the disclosure of which would adversely affect the National Security should be protected irrespective of the age of the data. Exemption for sources and methods material should be obtained.

The definitions of the Defense Classifications are not real problems. Individuals in many instances do not religiously advert to the. How about the control of official data?

Re: classification/declassification guidelines, they should be community standardized where possible, with provisions for exceptions, e.g., Sources & Methods, Communications Intelligence.

The EO should be specific re: the abuse of classification for the purpose of shielding inefficiency/error, etc.

I feel that the EO should be explicit in establishing sources and methods, commo intelligence as special categories to be protected.

If there is such a thing as joint classification (with foreign governments) we certainly should have some type of agreement re: declassification.

Re: access to classified material for research purposes, the need to know principle should apply.

Re: automatic downgrading, this has always given me somewhat of a problem inasmuch as we are anticipating that info which is classified at some point in time will no longer be classified in X number of years. It may be public info in a matter of hours, days, etc. and it may not.

The EO should contain sanctions with respect to the unauthorized disclosure of info, plus a requirement for the execution of Secrecy agreements, plus clearances to be issued on a need for access basis.